MATTEI_COMMENTARYFINAL_COMPLETE (DO NOT DELETE)

2/2/2022 11:56 AM

PRIVILEGE IN PERIL:
U.S. V. ZUBAYDAH AND THE STATE
SECRETS PRIVILEGE
ALANA MATTEI*

INTRODUCTION
U.S. v. Zubaydah presents an opportunity for the Court to settle
the scope of the state secrets privilege and the role of the judiciary
when the government invokes a claim of privilege.1 The state secrets
privilege, invoked by the executive, gives courts the power to prevent
the disclosure of information that could pose a threat to national
security by excluding the particular evidence or dismissing the case.
The Court will decide whether the Ninth Circuit erred by rejecting the
Government’s assertion of the state secrets privilege over the
depositions of former CIA contractors requested by Abu Zubaydah.2
The Ninth Circuit held the depositions could proceed because not all
of the requested information was privileged, and the district court
must attempt to separate privileged from nonprivileged information
in the disputed discovery before it may permissibly dismiss the claim.3
The Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s limited holding.
Privileged and nonprivileged information should be separated when
possible so that individuals can access nonprivileged information in
the interest of justice while still preserving national security.4 Allowing
the executive to make a blanket assertion of the state secrets privilege
and demand that this assertion be given nearly absolute deference
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1. 210 L. Ed. 2d 831 (2021).
2. Husayn v. Mitchell, 938 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2019).
3. Id. at 1137.
4. See id. at 1137-38 (explaining that because courts must honor principles of justice while
also balancing national security concerns, the court must try to extricate privileged information
from discovery before dismissing a case).
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would establish a dangerous precedent. A standard of absolute
deference would open the door to abuse of power. If an assertion of
the state secrets privilege is incontestable, there is no limit to what can
be kept from the public at any given time without reason.5 This is
especially worrisome if it is permissible for the executive to be
selective in its assertion of the privilege over similar information.
Most importantly, affirming the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the state
secrets privilege is in line with precedent and ultimately beneficial for
the public good.
I. FACTS
In early 2002, Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn (“Abu
Zubaydah”) was captured by Pakistani authorities who believed he
was a high-level member of Al-Qaida.6 From December 2002 to
September 2003, Abu Zubaydah was detained at a CIA site, allegedly
in Poland, where he was subject to “enhanced interrogation”
techniques, colloquially understood to mean torture.7 It is not
disputed that while at the site, Abu Zubaydah was subject to torture,
including waterboarding, confinement, and sleep deprivation.8 Two
independent contractors working for the CIA, James Elmer Mitchell
and John Jessen, allegedly proposed, developed, and twice supervised
the torture techniques used on Abu Zubaydah during his time at the
site.9 It is alleged that because of his treatment, Abu Zubaydah has
sustained brain damage and lost his left eye, in addition to other
physical impairments.10 Eventually, Abu Zubaydah was transferred
from the CIA site to Guantanamo Bay, where he remains to this day.11
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case stems from an ongoing Polish criminal investigation into
the torture of Abu Zubaydah, which allegedly occurred at a CIA
facility in Poland.12 The Polish investigation was initially opened in
2010 at Abu Zubaydah’s request. The investigation, however, was

5. See id. at 1134 (raising the possibility that the executive might use the privilege to
protect itself from embarrassing information).
6. Id. at 1126.
7. Id. at 1127.
8. Husayn, 938 F.3d at 1127 (9th Cir. 2019).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1126.
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quickly closed without prosecution when the United States refused
Poland’s request for information pursuant to the mutual legal
assistance treaty (MLAT) that the countries had previously agreed
to.13 In 2014, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found
that Abu Zubaydah had been held by the CIA in Poland from
December 2002 to September 2003 with Poland’s cooperation.14 The
ECHR also concluded that Poland’s earlier investigation into the
criminal complaint had been deficient.15 Polish prosecutors
subsequently reopened the investigation.16 The United States once
again, pursuant to the MLAT, denied Poland’s requests for helpful
information, including requests for Abu Zubaydah to provide
testimony.17
Given the United States’ lack of cooperation, Polish prosecutors
instead invited Abu Zubaydah’s counsel to provide evidence.18
Accordingly, Abu Zubaydah filed an application for discovery in the
district court under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a), which authorizes district courts
to order discovery for use in litigation outside the United States.19 The
application sought subpoenas for discovery from James Mitchell and
John Jessen, former CIA contractors who allegedly played a major
role in Abu Zubaydah’s torture.20 The district court granted the
application and subpoenas were served on Mitchell and Jessen.21 At
this point, the United States government (“the Government”)
intervened and filed a motion to quash the subpoenas based in part
on an assertion of state secrets privilege, supported by a declaration
by CIA Director Michael Pompeo.22 The district court found that
some, but not all, of the information requested was covered by the
state secrets privilege and quashed the subpoenas entirely.23
Abu Zubaydah appealed, and a split Ninth Circuit “reject[ed] the
government’s blanket assertion of state secrets privilege over

13. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, United States v. Husayn, No. 20-827 (Dec. 17,
2020).
14. Brief on the Merits for Respondents Abu Zubaydah and Joseph Margulies at 12,
United States. v. Husayn, (Dec. 17, 2020) (No. 20-827) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents].
15. Id. at 13.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 8.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Husayn v. Mitchell, 938 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2019).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1129–30.
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everything in Petitioners’ discovery request.”24 The court applied its
three-step Reynolds analysis for application of the state secrets
privilege.25 First, the court must confirm that there has been a formal
claim of privilege.26 In step two, the court must independently
determine whether the information in question is privileged.27 In the
final step, the court must decide “how the matter should proceed in
the light of a successful claim of privilege.”28
It is the Ninth Circuit’s analysis under steps two and three that
gives rise to the issues of this case.29 In its step two analysis, the court
determined that some of the disputed discovery was not privileged—
such as the fact that the CIA operated in Poland.30 Nevertheless, the
court recognized that other information, like the identities of the
foreign individuals who worked with the CIA, would be classified as
privileged.31 The court provided several bases for this determination.
First, the court emphasized that “in order to be a ‘state secret,’ a fact
must first be a ‘secret’,” and some of the information the Government
claimed to be privileged was already public knowledge.32 Next, the
court took issue with the Government’s concern about being
compelled to provide official confirmation to information that is
already in the public sphere.33 The Government argued that “the
absence of official confirmation from the CIA is the key to
preserving” uncertainty about whether already public information is
true.34 Even if it were to accept the Government’s apprehension about
official confirmation, the court reasoned that Mitchell and Jessen are
now private parties whose disclosures would technically not amount
to an official statement on behalf of the United States.35 Additionally,
the court reasoned that Poland’s role in spearheading the
investigation undercut Pompeo’s concern that disclosure would
breach trust with countries who work with the CIA because it is a
24. Id. at 1134.
25. See id. at 1131 (identifying the steps from Reynolds and then applying them to the
current case).
26. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953).
27. Husayn, 938 F.3d at 1131 (quoting Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d
1070, 1081 (9th Cir. 2010)).
28. Id. at 1134 (quoting Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1082).
29. See id. at 1130.
30. Id. at 1134.
31. Id. at 1133–34.
32. Id. at 1133.
33. Id. at 1132.
34. Husayn, 938 F.3d at 1133 (9th Cir. 2019).
35. Id.
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country that worked with the CIA that is seeking the information.36
Finally, the court underscored the necessity of balance between
executive and judicial power. The court reasoned that although the
judiciary should not undermine legitimate assertions of executive
power, it also should not permit the abuse of such power when it
determines that national security concerns are not legitimate.37
In step three of the analysis, a court confronted with a mix of
privileged and nonprivileged information must first determine
whether it is possible to disentangle the privileged information from
the nonprivileged information before dismissing a case.38 The court
held that because the district court failed to make a meaningful
attempt to separate the information, dismissal was inappropriate.39
The court emphasized that Mitchell and Jessen have already provided
similar nonprivileged information in another case before the district
court, using code names and pseudonyms with the blessing of the
government, to suggest that the separation attempt is likely to be
successful.40 In its limited holding, the Ninth Circuit allowed discovery
to proceed, instructing the district court to make a meaningful attempt
to separate privileged and nonprivileged information in the disputed
discovery and permitting the district court to dismiss if it ultimately
found this task impossible.41
In his dissent, Judge Gould took issue with the majority’s analysis
under step three of the test and argued that the court should defer
entirely to Pompeo’s declaration.42 He stated that dismissal is
warranted “if at step three of the Reynolds’ test it appears that
walking close to the line of actual state secrets may result in someone
overstepping that line to the detriment of the United States.”43 Gould
rejected the notion that codewords and pseudonyms could be used to
protect sensitive information in the depositions.44 He asserted that this
36. Id. at 1134.
37. See id. at 1134 (drawing a distinction between the Government’s valid use of privilege
to hide a legitimate secret and the impermissible use of trying to shield the Government from
embarrassment).
38. Id. at 1135 (quoting Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
39. Id. at 1137.
40. Husayn, 938 F.3d at 1137 (9th Cir. 2019).
41. Id. at 1137–38.
42. Id. at 1138.
43. Id. at 1138. The majority responds that a concern about “walking close to the line” has
no basis in the Ninth Circuit’s test which requires that nonsensitive information is released
“whenever possible.” Id. at 1134 n. 17.
44. See id. at 1139 (asserting that those measures would be ineffective in this case even
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would offer little protection because the information provided would
be viewed in the larger context of the Polish investigation into CIA
activity on its soil, thereby “risking the exposure of a broader picture
of national security material.”45 Last, the dissent took issue with the
fact that the information would ultimately be sent to another country
without the supervision of the United States court system, arguing
that this should be factored into the Reynolds analysis.46
The Government filed a petition for writ of certiorari on
December 17, 2020.47 On April 26, 2021, the Petition was granted.48
III. LEGAL HISTORY
A. The State Secrets Privilege
In United States v. Reynolds, the Court was asked to determine
whether certain evidence could be excluded from a tort claim against
the government based on the government’s assertion that the material
was privileged and that its disclosure would negatively impact
national security.49 The Court found that to assert privilege, the
government must first lodge a formal claim.50 Once this has been
done, the deciding “court itself must determine whether the
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege.”51 The Court
specified that there must be compromise between judicial and
executive power, urging that “judicial control over the evidence in a
case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.”52
The Court also indicated that the need for the evidence in
adjudicating the dispute bears on how much weight the deciding court
should give to the claim of privilege.53 Specifically, “where there is a
strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be
lightly accepted.”54 On the other hand, “even the most compelling

though they had been used previously).
45. Id. at 1140.
46. Husayn, 938 F.3d at 1140 (9th Cir. 2019).
47. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, United States v. Husayn, No. 20-827 (Dec. 17,
2020).
48. United States v. Husayn, 938 F.3d 1123, cert. granted, 141 S.Ct. 2564 (2021).
49. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1953) (noting the government’s
position that production would not be in the “public interest.”)
50. Id. at 7–8.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id. at 9–10.
53. Id. at 11.
54. Id.
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necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is
ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake.”55 In Reynolds,
for example, the Court found that necessity was minimized by the
availability of alternative sources of evidence and consequently held
that the requested evidence was privileged.56 In the face of a valid
privilege claim, the court can either dismiss the case entirely or
exclude the privileged evidence from the case, which might also result
in dismissal if the case cannot proceed without the evidence.57
B. Section 1782 Application
Under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1782, the “district court of the district in which
a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or
statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal…”58 Section 1782
applications for discovery are evaluated under a four-factor test
established in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.59
The four Intel factors are: (1) whether the person from whom
discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding; (2) the
nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings
underway abroad and the receptivity of the foreign government to
U.S. federal-court assistance; (3) whether the discovery request is an
attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other
policies of a foreign country or the United States; and, (4) whether the
discovery request is unduly intrusive or burdensome.60
Section 1782 contains a provision precluding the compulsion of
disclosures that would violate “any legally applicable privilege.”61
IV. PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
The Government challenges the Ninth Circuit’s holding on two
independent grounds. First, it contends that the state secrets privilege
applies to the requested information, thus bringing the discovery
request under Section 1782’s privilege exception.62 Second, even
55. See Reynolds, 345 U.S at 4–6.
56. Id.
57. Husayn v. Mitchell, 938 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2019).
58. 28 U.S.C.S. §1782(a).
59. 542 U.S. 241, 246–47 (2004).
60. Husayn v. Mitchell, 938 F.3d 1123, 1129 n. 9 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Intel, 542 U.S. at
264–65).
61. §1782(a).
62. Brief for the United States, United States v. Husayn, (Dec. 17, 2020) (No. 20-827)
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assuming the information is not privileged, the Government asserts
that this request to assist foreign prosecutors falls outside the scope of
Section 1782.63
A. State Secrets Privilege
The significant error underlying the Ninth Circuit’s holding,
according to the Government, is its failure to afford appropriate
deference to Director Pompeo’s judgment regarding the risks to
national security posed by deposing Mitchell and Jessen.64 The
Government asserts that precedent requires courts to afford “the
utmost deference” to executive branch determinations regarding
national security risks when considering an assertion of the state
secrets privilege.65 Thus, the Government argues, the Ninth Circuit’s
requirement of “skeptical” review contradicts this precedent and
“erroneously invites courts to substitute their own views” for those of
executive officials.66 Furthermore, the Government views the fact that
the information is ultimately destined to be sent to a foreign tribunal
as a factor that mandates enhanced deference.67 Under Reynolds, the
Government alleges, where the destination is foreign and necessity is
purportedly not great, the Government should only need to show
“that the discovery poses a facially plausible risk to the national
security” to establish a successful privilege claim.68
The Government also takes issue with the Ninth Circuit’s
assertion that the privilege does not apply to Mitchell and Jessen
because they were CIA contractors at the time and are now private
citizens who do not speak on behalf of the United States.69 As the
Government’s argument goes, viewing Mitchell and Jessen as private
parties neglects the fact that they obtained the information while
working for the CIA. Disclosure of this information, therefore, would
be a breach of trust with the CIA’s secret international partners.70
Moreover, the Government argues that precedent has long applied
this privilege to government contractors.71 If contractors were not
[hereinafter Brief for the United States].
63. Id. at 21.
64. Id. at 19.
65. Id. at 24.
66. Id. at 25.
67. Brief for the United States, supra note 62, at 40.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 26.
70. Id. at 27.
71. Id. at 28–29.
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covered, according to the Government, the consequences would be
dire.72 Since the United States government often uses contractors,
excluding them from protection would create a giant loophole that
could be exploited by compelling contractors to disclose information
that would otherwise be privileged.73
The Government further rebukes the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning
that the information in question is not secret, and accordingly not
privileged, because it is essentially public knowledge.74 The
Government asserts that public speculation does not “undermine the
government’s ability to invoke the privilege to prevent its own
employees and contractors with first-hand knowledge from being
compelled by a court to confirm or deny that information.”75 The
Government argues that this is based in precedent which recognizes
that, without official confirmation, public speculation retains a level of
doubt necessary to preserve national security.76 Further, the Ninth
Circuit’s claim of public knowledge is based in part on the ECHR’s
findings and public news stories, sources which the Government
deems questionable.77 The Government takes issue with the ECHR
findings because they were based in part on the “adverse inferences it
chose to draw against Poland, because Poland declined to confirm or
deny the allegations…”78
The Government argues that a foreign partner’s refusal to
respond to allegations about the United States should not turn those
allegations into public knowledge and consequently destroy the
Government’s right to assert the state secrets privilege.79 This would
mean that regardless of whether the foreign partner substantiates or
denies the allegations, it has essentially destroyed the state secrets
privilege for the United States.
Last, the Government disagrees with the majority that Poland’s
role in seeking the information diminishes national security
concerns.80 According to the Government, the agreement to keep

72. See id. at 28 (stressing that contractors are entrusted with classified information, the
disclosure of which could harm national security).
73. Brief for the United States, supra note 62 at 29.
74. Id. at 30.
75. Id. (emphasis in original).
76. Id. at 31.
77. Brief for the United States, supra note 62, at 35.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 38.
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cooperation with the CIA secret is limited in scope, meaning that the
CIA can owe secrecy to one part or particular administration of the
foreign government.81 Thus, the fact that current Polish authorities are
seeking information on this matter does not vitiate the CIA’s existing
promise of secrecy to other parts of the government or the previous
administration.82
B. Section 1782
The Government presents an alternative, independent reason to
reverse the Ninth Circuit decision: the Intel factors that courts must
use in their exercise of discretion under Section 1782 weigh strongly
against compelling discovery here.83 The Government claims that
because of its analysis under these factors, the district court
“ultimately refused to issue an order” compelling discovery.84 The
Government appears to concede that the first Intel factor weighs in
favor of discovery because Mitchell and Jessen are not participants in
the Polish proceeding.85 The remaining three factors, however, weigh
against discovery.86 According to the Government, the second factor,
which deals with the nature of the foreign proceedings and the
receptivity of the foreign government “counsel great caution here.”87
The Government asserts that the Polish proceedings are “highly
atypical,”88 and Poland’s government is not necessarily receptive to
the Section 1782 request, as evidenced by Poland’s refusal to allow its
former President to provide information to prosecutors.89 The
Government also contends, echoing the language of the fourth Intel
factor, that the requested discovery would be “unduly intrusive or
burdensome” because the Government would have to police the

81. See id. at 38 (explaining that the CIA’s promise of secrecy applies even in the face of
actions by other elements of the foreign government or new politicians seeking information
about their predecessors).
82. See id. (asserting that the role of Polish prosecutors in seeking information does not
diminish the potential harm of compelling discovery from Mitchell and Jessen).
83. Brief for the United States, supra note 62, at 21.
84. Id. at 42–43.
85. Id. at 43.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Brief for the United States, supra note 62, at 44 (further noting that “Poland’s
executive leadership has therefore done precisely what the United States is attempting to do
here: ensure that those who may have information obtained during their past government
service uphold their duty of secrecy in the face of a Polish investigation into Abu Zubaydah’s
charges.”).
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discovery to prevent the disclosure of state secrets.90 Most
importantly, per the third Intel factor, the Government argues that
Respondent’s Section 1782 request is a blatant attempt to circumvent
the policies of the United States and its MLAT with Poland, and this
alone should be dispositive.91
V. RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
A. State Secrets Privilege
Respondents, Abu Zubaydah and his attorney, assert that the
Court should uphold the Ninth Circuit’s decision.92 Respondents first
establish, using the Government’s own admission as evidence, that not
all of the information sought is privileged because some of it has
already been declassified by the Government.93 Further supporting
this assertion is the fact that Mitchell and Jessen have twice testified
without Government intervention about the same type of unclassified
information that the Government now contends is privileged.94 “This
prior testimony included some of what they observed at the site at
issue here and what they did to Abu Zubaydah elsewhere.”95
Likewise, Respondents contend that the nonprivileged information
can be easily disentangled from the privileged information because
codenames and other methods can be used to protect against
disclosure of sensitive information, such as geographic location.96
Respondents further argue that Mitchell and Jessen cannot provide
“official” confirmation or denial of any information because they are
private citizens, not agents of the Government.97
Respondents next assert that Abu Zubaydah has made a strong
showing of necessity, as required by the second step of Reynolds, thus
weakening the Government’s privilege claim.98 Poland has repeatedly
requested Abu Zubaydah’s testimony, but the United States
government has prohibited him from testifying on his own behalf.99
Furthermore, his attorneys are likewise prohibited from providing
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 47.
Id. at 44.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 55.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 37.
Id. at 39.
Id.
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information on his behalf without CIA approval.100 Thus, according to
Respondents, Abu Zubaydah has no avenue to gather evidence other
than Mitchell and Jessen’s testimony and “a greater showing of
necessity can scarcely be imagined.”101
Respondents further assert that the overseas destination of the
information is essentially irrelevant in a determination of its
privilege.102 They argue that information is privileged regardless of its
planned use or destination. Instead, what matters is only whether the
evidence will expose national security secrets. Accordingly,
Respondents see minimal difference between domestic and foreign
tribunals in this context. Furthermore, because court proceedings are
public and available online, anyone in the world can access them
regardless of whether they took place on foreign or domestic soil.103
Here, however, the domestic court will supervise the requested
testimony before anything is sent overseas, providing an added level
of domestic control. Thus, an overseas destination alone does not
warrant an expansion of the state secrets privilege through enhanced
deference to the executive.104
Last, Respondents claim the Government is trying to replace the
established Reynolds doctrine with a “standard of blind deference.”105
Respondents argue that this contradicts longstanding Supreme Court
precedent and also violates the separation of powers established in
the Constitution.106 According to Respondents, precedent mandates
that the Court not blindly accept the executive’s assertion of
privilege.107 Judicial oversight, they argue, protects against the abuse
of executive power.108 Moreover, there is no need for deference on the
“antecedent question of whether a secret actually exists, or on the
subsequent question of how the case should proceed when the court
finds that some, but not all, of the information at issue is
privileged.”109 Answering these questions is squarely within the
judiciary’s role, and it is not the executive branch’s responsibility.110
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 39.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 42.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 43.
Id.
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Driving their point home, Respondents establish that the Government
has already explicitly approved the test applied by the Ninth Circuit,
including the “skeptical” review requirement at issue here.111 The
Government opposed certiorari in the test’s foundational case and
endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s application of precedent in its judicial
review process.112
B. Section 1782
Respondents argue that the Government did not properly
establish its abuse-of-discretion argument before the Court because it
was not presented in the petition or motion to quash.113 If the Court
decides to consider this argument anyway, Respondents deny it has
any merit because contrary to what the Government claims, the
district court initially granted the Section 1782 application per the
Intel factors and permitted respondents to serve the subpoenas.114 The
Government concedes that the first Intel factor weighs in favor of
discovery, so this factor is no longer an issue.115 The district court also
held the second factor favors discovery, finding that Poland’s attempts
to obtain information through the MLAT process demonstrated the
Polish government’s receptivity to the information.116 The district
court found that the third factor, which deals with whether the Section
1782 application is an attempt to circumvent the MLAT, is a close
call.117 Respondents assert that as a private individual, Abu
Zubaydah’s attempt to obtain discovery is independent from Poland’s
attempt to obtain the same discovery through the MLAT.118 Thus,
even though the third factor could help either side, discovery should
still not be precluded because Abu Zubaydah’s attempt to obtain
discovery is distinct from Poland’s attempt.119 Regarding the fourth
factor, the district court found that discovery would not be “unduly
intrusive or burdensome.”120 Finally, Respondents argue that in the
event the Court found the Government’s abuse-of-discretion
argument convincing, the proper remedy would be to remand to the
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 45.
Id.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 47.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 52.
Id.
Id. at 53.
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district court, which the Ninth Circuit has already done.121

VI. ANALYSIS
The Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision. In affirming,
the Court would preserve precedent, deny selective enforcement of
the privilege against the same information in different contexts, and
reject a new standard of increased deference that weakens the
judiciary and dangerously empowers the executive. Beyond affirming
the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Court should use this case as an
opportunity to decisively resolve the issue of governmental
contractors. The Court should confirm that once contractors become
private citizens, they no longer speak for the government, and their
statements do not amount to official confirmation or denial.
A. Preserving Good Precedent
The test applied by the Ninth Circuit is in line with precedent and
should be affirmed. By asking for nearly unlimited deference, the
Government is essentially asking the Court to overturn the Ninth
Circuit’s requirement that an independent judicial judgment be made
regarding the appropriateness of the privilege claim. The Ninth
Circuit derived this requirement directly from the Supreme Court’s
decision in Reynolds,122 which explicitly instructs the deciding court to
make an independent determination about national security risks.123
Moreover, the Government itself has already considered and
explicitly approved the Ninth Circuit’s test for the state secrets
privilege.124 When the Government opposed certiorari in the Ninth
Circuit’s foundational case for this test, it explicitly sanctioned the test
as a correct application of “established legal principles” and “not [in]
conflict with any decision of this Court or any other court of
appeals.”125 In light of this, there is no reason for the Court mandate
absolute deference to the executive simply because the Government
appears to have changed its mind.
The precedent requiring an independent judicial judgment should
121. Id.
122. Husayn v. Mitchell, 938 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir. 2019).
123. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8.
124. Brief for the United States, supra note 62, in Opposition at 11, Mohamed v. Jeppesen
Dataplan Inc., (April 2011) (No. 10-778).
125. Id.
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be upheld because its underlying rationales are strong. First,
overturning precedent by requiring increased deference would permit
selective enforcement of the privilege against the same information in
different contexts. Allowing the Government to selectively apply the
state secrets privilege allows it to act as a gatekeeper of justice,
deciding which individuals have access to identical information in the
pursuit of justice. For example, here, the Government asserts the
privilege over information from Mitchell and Jessen despite the fact
that they have already provided the exact same information in
another case.126 Mitchell and Jessen were deposed in another case
brought against them by the ACLU on behalf of three individuals
who were subjected to torture while in United States custody.127 The
depositions occurred in the presence of attorneys from various
government entities including the Department of Justice, CIA, and
the Department of Defense.128 The Government provided Mitchell
and Jessen with guidance that identified certain information as
classified and instructed them not to reference that information in
their answers.129 During the depositions, the Government further
protected its interests by objecting and privately consulting with
deponents about the permissible scope of their answers.130 These
depositions are now available to the public.131 Here, much of the
information surrounding Abu Zubaydah’s detention has already been
declassified by the Government.132 Accordingly, Mitchell and Jessen
should be permitted to give depositions for Abu Zubaydah on
declassified, nonprivileged information with the same government
guidance and oversight.
Second, overturning precedent would result in a new standard that
weakens the judiciary and dangerously empowers the executive. The
Court established the principles in Reynolds to strike a balance
between executive and judicial power.133 Without the requirement for
an independent judicial determination, the deciding court would be
bound to take the Government’s assertion of privilege at face value,
even when it is blatantly erroneous. This leaves the door open for

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Brief for the United States, supra note 62, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 12.
Brief for the United States, supra note 62, at 3.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9.

MATTEI_COMMENTARYFINAL_COMPLETE (DO NOT DELETE)

210

2/2/2022 11:56 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 17

abuses of executive power. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, the state
secrets privilege exists to protect secret information that poses a
national security risk, not information that the Government would
rather keep concealed to avoid embarrassment.134 The increased,
essentially absolute, deference standard proposed here would
essentially eliminate the court’s prescribed role in the state secrets
privilege, instead allowing the executive branch to withhold
information from the public on a whim.
Last, the Government argues that increased deference is
particularly appropriate when the information is destined for a
foreign tribunal.135 This argument largely ignores several important
considerations. First, U.S. courts will play a gatekeeping role in
deciding what information is released to the foreign forum.136 Second,
even when information is destined for a domestic forum, “court
proceedings are presumptively public” and the internet makes
information internationally available.137 Thus, this argument for
increased deference is unconvincing.
B. Government Contractors
Petitioner and Respondent hold diametrically opposed views on
the impact of statements made by former government contractors
who are now private citizens. The Government believes that their
status as private citizens is essentially irrelevant because they
obtained the information in question while employed by the
government.138 Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that because
they are now private citizens, they cannot confirm or deny anything
on behalf of the United States.139
Respondent’s argument is more convincing for two reasons. First,
as the Government stressed, the United States utilizes contractors
often, and for a variety of defense-related fields.140 If the Court were
to hold that statements made by Mitchell and Jessen would amount to
official confirmation of state secrets, it would create a blanket
protection over a considerable number of people. This would amount
134. Husayn, 938 F.3d at 1134.
135. Brief for the United States, supra note 62, at 39.
136. Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 41.
137. See id. (explaining that testimony that was published online is out of the control of the
U.S. court system and can be accessed by anyone in the world).
138. Brief for the United States, supra note 62, at 26.
139. Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 37.
140. Brief for the United States, supra note 62, at 29.
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to a great expansion of the state secrets privilege by giving the
Government the power to successfully, but unnecessarily, make a
comprehensive assertion of privilege over all former contractors. On
the other hand, an explicit ruling that former contractors do not speak
for the United States is ultimately beneficial for the public good.
Those who need nonprivileged information from contractors would
be able to access it in pursuit of justice. The Government would also
benefit because there would still be a seed of doubt about the
truthfulness of the information shared in the absence of an official
government statement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should
establish that contractors are not protected by the state secrets
privilege.
VII. ORAL ARGUMENT
The Government began its oral argument by emphasizing the
importance of trust with the United States’ covert intelligence
partners and alleging that further discovery would breach this trust.141
Justice Thomas expressed concern about the implications of the
“utmost deference” standard, pressing the Government to point to a
situation in which the Government would fail the test.142 The
Government responded that it should fail only in “relatively unusual”
circumstances.143 Later, the Government clarified that “predictive
national security judgments… deserve deference no matter how great
the showing of necessity is.”144
Justice Sotomayor took interest in the Government’s alternative
abuse-of-discretion argument, particularly the United States’ denial
when Poland sought assistance through the MLAT.145 When asked,
the Government essentially conceded that denial of assistance
pursuant to an MLAT should always defeat a Section 1782 claim, as it
was unable to identify a single example where denial should not be
sufficient to defeat a claim.146
Chief Justice Roberts suggested that Mitchell and Jessen could
provide information that had nothing to do with the location where

141. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, United States v. Husayn (Oct. 6, 2021) (No. 20-827)
[Transcript of Oral Argument].
142. Id. at 6.
143. Id. at 7.
144. Id. at 10.
145. Id. at 13.
146. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 14.
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the events took place.147 The Government pushed back on this,
asserting that the location would still be relevant because the
information would be revealed in the larger context of a Polish
proceeding.148 Justice Barrett intimated that this meant the
information itself is not privileged, but rather that the Government is
trying to make the context create a privilege.149 The Government
ostensibly confirmed that the context of the foreign forum lies at the
root of its problems, admitting that if the information was destined for
a domestic proceeding, it is doubtful that the Government would be
asserting privilege.150
Respondents began their argument by asserting that they have no
plan to ask in discovery whether the events took place in Poland and
instead plan to ask about “what happened in Abu Zubaydah’s cell
between December 2002 and September 2003.”151 Unfortunately for
Respondents, several justices challenged this assertion, seemingly
confused about what exactly Respondents were hoping to uncover in
the depositions and why this discovery was necessary.152
Justice Sotomayor reiterated her interest in the Section 1782
argument, expressing concern that further discovery would effectively
ignore the MLAT between Poland and the United States.153 Finally,
Justice Kagan pushed back on the idea of distinguishing between
contractors and employees in this context because United States allies
presumably would not make this distinction themselves.154
In their concluding questions, Justice Gorsuch and Justice Breyer
pressed the Government to answer whether it would make Abu
Zubaydah available to testify on his own behalf but did not receive a
direct answer.155
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Instead of
handing the executive practically unlimited power in the realm of the
state secrets privilege, the Court ought to reject the Government’s
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 47.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 72.
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blanket assertion of the state secrets privilege. The Court should
permit the subpoenas of the individuals in question and allow the
district court to attempt to separate privileged and nonprivileged
information before possibly dismissing the case. Mitchell and Jessen
have been permitted to reveal similar nonprivileged information on
multiple occasions and have done so without revealing any
information covered by the state secrets privilege. This can and should
be done again. Affirming the Ninth Circuit’s limited holding preserves
precedent, protects national security, and maintains the balance
between the judiciary and the executive.

